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 DLD-120       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3886 
 ___________ 
 
 T. BARRY GRAY, 
 Individually and As Executor of The Estate of Thelma L. Gray, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
ANGELA L. MARTINEZ, Individually and In Her Capacity as Director of Office of 
Judicial Support of Delaware County; DEBORAH GASTON, Individually and In Her 
Capacity as Former Director of Office of Judicial Support of Delaware  County; TCIF 
REO CIT LLC; WACHOVIA BANK NAT'L ASSOC, FKA FIRST UNION 
NATIONAL BANK; JOSEPH F. MCGINN, Individually and In His Capacity as Sheriff 
of Delaware County; SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC., FKA FAIRBANKS 
CAPITAL CORPORATION 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2-08-cv-02603) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
 Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 16, 2012 
 Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: February 24, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 The pro se appellant, T. Barry Gray, requests review of a series of District Court 
decisions dismissing his complaint against the appellees.  Finding no substantial question 
to be presented by this appeal, we will summarily affirm. 
 Gray brought suit in June of 2008, seeking ―declaratory and injunctive relief and 
money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Law[,] and Pennsylvania Statutes and common law.‖  Compl. ¶ 1, 
ECF No. 17.  He complained that the defendants had all played a part in unlawfully 
foreclosing on the home of his mother, Thelma L. Gray, by knowingly exploiting certain 
irregularities in the pertinent mortgage documents and manipulating state-court 
proceedings.  Those defendants were: Angela Martinez and Deborah Gaston, Directors of 
Delaware County‘s Office of Judicial Support who were ―responsible for the records of 
the Court of Common Pleas,‖ Compl. ¶¶ 6–7; Joseph McGinn, the sheriff of Delaware 
County, Compl. ¶ 11; Select Portfolio Servicing (SPS), Compl. ¶ 9; TCIF REO CIT, LLC 
(TCIF),
1
 an alleged affiliate of SPS, Compl. ¶¶ 8, 52; and Wachovia Bank, the successor 
in interest to the original mortgage and its accompanying note, Compl. ¶¶ 10, 14.  Gray 
alleged that TCIF, SPS, and Wachovia (the ―financial defendants‖) had ―deceived‖ the 
state courts into entering a default judgment against the Grays, Compl. ¶ 21; that McGinn 
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―scheduled a sheriff‘s sale . . . based on this excessive judgment,‖ Compl. ¶ 26; and that 
Martinez and Gaston entered the incorrect judgment amounts ―pursuant to an official 
policy entering default judgments in whatever amount is sought by plaintiff, regardless of 
whether that amount is supported,‖ Compl. ¶ 29; see also Compl. ¶¶ 31–34.  Gray 
organized his complaint into four claims, and sought relief that included a ―judgment . . . 
ordering defendants to return title of Plaintiffs[‘] home to them as it was entered prior to 
the state court judgment.‖  Compl. IX ¶ 4.  
 Over the course of the litigation, the defendants succeeded in dismissing the 
complaint in piecemeal fashion through similar motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) 
and 12(b)(6).  See Orders, ECF Nos. 27, 36 (dismissing claims against SPS, Martinez, 
Gaston, and McGinn).  The District Court dismissed claims against the final two 
defendants, Wachovia and TCIF, as part of a lengthy memorandum that also discussed 
the Court‘s decision to set aside default judgments against those two defendants.  See 
Gray v. Martinez, No. 08–2603, 2011 WL 4389543, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2011).2  
The Court determined that the complaint was defective under the Rooker-Feldman
3
 
doctrine, depriving it of jurisdiction.  It also observed that Gray had failed to adequately 
                                                                                                                                                             
1
 TCIF‘s successor, VRF, is the entity participating in the litigation.  As our recitation 
today focuses on the deficiencies of the complaint, which named TCIF, we will use that 
designation to avoid additional confusion.  
2
 TCIF also requested injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651 and 2283, which does 
not appear to have been granted.  See Memo. of Law 14–17, ECF No. 71-4; Order, ECF 
No. 80. 
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plead a claim against the non-state actors.  Id. at *3–4.  This appeal followed.  
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and conduct plenary review of Rule 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) dismissals, as well as of the District Court‘s jurisdictional 
determination.  Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino‘s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 436 (3d 
Cir. 1997).  A decision to set aside a default judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
Stjernholm v. Peterson, 83 F.3d 347, 349 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996); O‘Connor v. Nevada, 27 
F.3d 357, 364 (9th Cir. 1994); cf. Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  We may summarily affirm if the appeal does not present a substantial 
question, and may do so on any basis supported by the record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 
F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Fairview Park Excavating Co. v. Al Monzo 
Constr. Co., 560 F.2d 1122, 1123 n.2 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a losing state-court party is ―barred from 
seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United 
States district court, based on [a] claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser‘s 
federal rights.‖  Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994).  ―[T]here are four 
requirements that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal 
plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state-court 
judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) 
the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments‖; the 
                                                                                                                                                             
3
 D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 
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second and fourth factors are ―the key to determining whether a federal suit presents an 
independent, non-barred claim.‖  Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild 
LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citations, quotations, and alterations 
omitted).  We have recently emphasized the narrowness of the doctrine, distinguishing 
between injuries caused by the state-court judgment and those brought about by the 
defendants‘ actions.  See id. at 167–68.  In so doing, we have ―recognized that caution is 
now appropriate in relying on our [prior] formulation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 
which focused on whether the state and federal suits were ‗inextricably intertwined.‘‖ Id. 
at 169 (internal quotations, citations omitted).   
 According to the record, a default judgment in the state foreclosure action was 
entered in 2002; shortly thereafter, the Grays attempted to strike the default judgment, but 
were denied relief.  A 2003 appeal was unsuccessful.  First Union Nat‘l Bank v. Gray, 
841 A.2d 582 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (table).  As part of its motion to dismiss, TCIF 
enclosed a recent copy of the state-court docket, showing that the proceedings continued 
for long after the 2003 appeal.  However, there is no indication that the default judgment 
was ever overturned or otherwise nullified.  While the state proceedings may have still 
been ongoing when Gray commenced this federal civil suit—the state docket appears to 
reflect activity through mid-2009—we are satisfied that the default judgment suffices for 
the purposes of Rooker-Feldman. 
                                                                                                                                                             
U.S. 413 (1923). 
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 Having reviewed the record, and liberally interpreting Gray‘s pleadings, see 
Moore v. Coats Co., 270 F.2d 410, 411 (3d Cir. 1959), we conclude that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine bars suit against Gaston and McGinn.  For these defendants, the injury 
directly flows from the state-court judgment; Gaston allegedly entered the judgment 
(indeed, that is the only conduct about which Gray complains), while McGinn brought 
about its outcome.  To find the defendants‘ conduct unlawful would require us to directly 
review the validity of the state-court judgment, which Rooker-Feldman is intended to 
prevent. 
 With regard to Martinez, Gray‘s only charge is that she ―continues the policies 
utilized by defendants Gaston and McGinn as set forth in this action.‖  It is unclear 
whether Gray intends to allege that Martinez was directly involved in entering the 
complained-of state-court judgment.  If she was, then the claims against her are barred by 
Rooker-Feldman as explained above.  If she was not, and if Gray alleges only that she 
continues to enter orders in accordance with a policy to which Gray objects, the claims 
against her are jurisdictionally defective for lack of Article III standing, as Gray does not 
explain how Martinez was involved in any non-speculative injury to him.  See Nat‘l Org. 
for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994) (Article III standing is jurisdictional); 
Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 290–91 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining 
requirements for Article III standing).   
Gray appears to allege that the financial defendants committed fraud by their 
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actions in commencing and executing the foreclosure action; that they, in other words, 
misrepresented various values to the state courts, acted in a deceptive manner, and 
otherwise deceived the tribunal, causing him injury.  Part of the harm allegedly occurred 
before the default judgment, a question of timing that we have identified as a ―useful 
guidepost‖ in thinking about Rooker-Feldman.  See Great W., 615 F.3d at 167.  Gray 
further alleges additional malfeasance in appraising the property and in connection with 
the sheriff‘s sale.  All told, while the question is close, we cannot conclude that Gray‘s 
claims against the financial defendants would require us to directly review the state-court 
decision.  As such, Rooker-Feldman does not present a bar to jurisdiction.
4
  
However, we hold further that Gray has failed to state a claim against the 
remaining defendants on which relief could be granted.  To the extent that he attempts to 
proceed via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he has not shown that the financial defendants ―acted 
under color of state or territorial law.‖  Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 
(3d Cir. 1995); see also Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009).  His 42 U.S.C. 
                                                 
4
 In finding otherwise, the District Court observed: ―Whether the movants had the legal 
right to foreclose on the mortgage loan has been determined in state court and cannot be 
reconsidered by a federal court.‖  Gray, 2011 WL 4389543, at *4.  However, ―[i]f a 
federal plaintiff ‗present[s] some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal 
conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party . . ., then there 
is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of 
preclusion.‘‖  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005) 
(citing GASH Assocs. v. Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)).  Were the 
financial defendants to have engaged in fraud, collusion, or other malfeasance in securing 
foreclosure, Rooker-Feldman would not prevent the exercise of jurisdiction simply 
because relief would cast doubt on the state-court judgment.   
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§ 1985 claim fails because, inter alia, his conspiracy allegations are merely conclusory.  
Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).  Finally, while Gray invoked 
violations of state common law and/or state consumer-protection statutes, his complaint 
fails to actually plead those violations, aside from their inclusion in its preamble and in 
reference to Gaston and McGinn, whom we have already excluded from liability.  See 
Compl. ¶ 45. 
In sum, we determine that the complaint was partially barred by Rooker-Feldman, 
and partially defective for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.  These 
defects go to the heart of the action, and we are satisfied that amendment would be futile.  
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).  Finally, we detect 
no abuse of discretion in setting aside the default judgments against selected defendants.  
We will therefore summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Appellees‘ outstanding motions for summary action are denied 
as unnecessary.
5
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
5
 We must address two arguments raised in the motion for summary affirmance filed by 
Martinez, Gaston, and McGinn.  First, those appellees claim that Gray‘s notice of appeal 
is untimely as to the specific order dismissing them from the case.  But that order was not 
a ―final‖ order that would give us jurisdiction.  28 U.S.C. § 1291; Catlin v. United States, 
324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).  Second, they argue that Gray‘s notice of appeal ―is for the 
September 21, 2011 Order only and not the January 24, 2011 Order relative to‖ them.  It 
has been our longstanding practice to construe a pro se notice of appeal liberally so as to 
include prior orders and judgments that substantially relate to the specific order being 
appealed.  See Ghana v. Holland, 226 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 2000).   
